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A four-day conference organised by CEESP in collaboration with the Social Science Research Council,
New York, brought together leading thinkers on the subject of governance in August this year. The objec-
tive of Beyond Governance, which took place in Murree, Pakistan, was to apply an emerging understand-
ing of governance to a concrete issue – within a regional context – in this case South Asia. Through a
selection of papers and extracts of papers presented in Murree, Policy Matters examines the issue of gov-
ernance from a number of different perspectives, leading with a critical examination of the concept of gov-
ernance and its current uses, extracted from a longer paper by Professor Matthias Finger.
The special importance of both the concept and the practice of governance stems from the fact that globalisation
has profoundly altered the premises of and the ground-rules for traditional nation-state politics. As traditional, local,
national and international political institutions are no longer adequate to meet the challenges created by the pro-
cess of industrial development, ‘governance’ emerges as a new concept, directly related to the process of glob-
alisation. 
Globalisation is defined here as the latest stage of a process where technological, economic, ecological, cultural,
and military trends, traditionally observable on a geographically limited scale and scope, are extended to the entire
globe. First separately, but increasingly in a synergistic manner – and therefore ever accelerating - these trends
lead to the emergence of new players with new and different (power) relationships among them. Let me briefly
comment here on each of these five trends separately.
Technological globalisation – which is the result of global scientific development – is certainly most fundamental,
as this is the process which underlies and accelerates most if not all other processes, in particular those of eco-
nomic and cultural globalisation. Key players are techno-scientific institutions, whose aim is to make scientific
progress useful for commercial and political interests. As almost all of these institutions work with the same sci-
entific rationality, the outcomes of technological globalisation are quite homogeneous.
The field of communication perfectly illustrates how technological globalisation influences cultural globalisation .
Indeed, whether it is because of the media, communication or tourism, more and more inhabitants of the planet
share the same cultural references and define themselves in respect to the same dreams, mostly American ones.
This, of course, leads to a certain uniformity, as well as a loss of cultural diversity (e.g., Ritzer, 1998). However,
this process of cultural globalisation is not necessarily synonymous with cultural homogenisation, since this new
‘global culture’ is often fragmented and incoherent, victim as it is of rapidly changing fads and fashions. The main
actors here are media and entertainment conglomerates, which are in fewer and fewer hands. One must also
mention that parallel to the standardisation of culture one can observe a localisation and so-called “ethno-isation”
as a reaction to it. 
It is in the area of economy and business that the phenomenon of globalisation has probably been best studied
(e.g., Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Dunning, 1993;), and often equated to globalisation per se. However, one must
distinguish here between the globalisation of the financial networks (which are by now almost totally integrated),
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ally served industrial development and
its promoters, has been made obsolete
by the very process it has actively pro-
moted. And in some cases, if one reads
neo-liberal literature, the nation-state is
now the key obstacle to further growth
and economic expansion. If the win-
ners of globalisation want to do away
with the nation-state, the losers,
instead, seem to put all their hopes in
it. Indeed, many peoples, especially in
the developing countries, seem to think
that the same nation-state, which at
least in part has caused their hard-
ships, will now protect them from the
negative effects of globalisation. 
It is probably premature to say exactly
where the nation-state is heading as a
result of the numerous attempts to
adapt to and cope with globalisation.
However, it is possible to identify four
types of pressure imposed on the
nation-state by globalisation. As profits
increasingly globalise and social and
environmental costs increasingly
localise, the nation-state runs into a
structural financial problem, where it
inevitably has do more with less.
Secondly, there is a growing crisis of
legitimacy as global actors increasingly
dictate what nation-states should do
(either by bypassing or by instrumen-
talising them), and society increasingly
has reactive, defensive, and therefore
temporary demands. Along with the
structural financial problems, the
state’s declining credibility in turn leads
to a loss of political coherence and col-
lective problem-solving capacity. 
Over the past ten years or so many
new collective problem-solving mecha-
nisms, along with corresponding insti-
tutions, have emerged – a phe-
nomenon described by the concept of
‘governance’. 
At the level of society, there are also many vic-
tims of the same process, in particular those
who are least mobile socially, geographically
and professionally. At an ecological level, the
first victims of globalisation are the species and
people who depend directly on natural
resources for survival. On a cultural level we are
arguably all victims of globalisation, since for
most of us, our identity remains linked to a geo-
graphical location with a given culture and lan-
guage. Globalisation, on the other hand, has
become synonymous with a loss of roots, loss
of meaning and identity.
In short, while globalisation builds on historical
trends of rationalisation, institutionalisation,
expansion and further socio-cultural and eco-
logical degradation and exploitation, it now
seems to have reached a new stage in the form
of new and institutionalised global organisations
(TNCs, NGOs, multilateral organisations). This
new global institutional reality is, however, par-
alleled by a corresponding process of localisa-
tion, characterised mainly by its defensiveness
and reactiveness. 
What future for 
“old politics”?
The question now is what role do traditional
political players – national and local govern-
ments, international institutions, public adminis-
trations, public enterprises, political parties, and
many others more – play in the new framework.
For the nation-state, the historical unit within
which collective problems have traditionally
been addressed, this is a particularly paradoxi-
cal situation. The nation-state was, and to a cer-
tain extent still is, a significant player in all five
processes of globalisation: cultural homogeni-
sation, ecological destruction, techno-scientific
advancements (often tied to the military), mili-
tary conquest, and of economic growth and
industrial development more generally. Today, it
seems, the same nation-state, after having loy-
least mobile lose out, i.e., natural resources lose out against
workers, and workers lose out against capital. Consumption,
of course, also goes global, as culture becomes more uni-
form, and as production spreads world-wide. Consequently,
companies which produce these new global goods and ser-
vices increasingly merge, and turn the planet into one big
supermarket. Such concentration can now be found in all
sectors, some of which are already highly cartelised as a
result of economic globalisation.
Ecology has also become globalised. Since the beginning of
the 1980s, favoured by a new scientific approach called
‘Global Change’ (Malone & Roederer, 1985) the planet has
increasingly been seen as a single global system (Sachs,
1993). As a consequence, many ecological issues and prob-
lems are seen as a threat to the entire Biosphere. This is now
the case with nuclear pollution, climate change, ozone deple-
tion, biodiversity destruction, and many other resource- or
pollution-related issues. The actors of this new global eco-
logical awareness can be found in the scientific community,
among international environmental NGOs, and indigenous
peoples’ organisations (Tamiotti & Finger, forthcoming).
Even the military, traditionally very much tied to the nation-
state, has become globalised, parallel to planetary security
concerns, some of which are now of a non-military nature.
In each of these five dimensions of globalisation there are
new actors emerging for whom the playing field is now the
entire globe. Until recently, transnational corporations (TNCs)
were considered to be the most typical such new global
actors (e.g., Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Korten, 1995). Some
of them – with their strategic vision, their mobility, and their
economic and sometimes even political power – have
already become more powerful than many governments.
However, this same phenomenon of globalisation also
extends to civil society (Princen & Finger, 1994) in the form
of ‘multinational’ non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In
addition, new global agencies have emerged which are no
longer controlled directly by governments as in the case of
most UN agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, such as
the GATT and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), or the World Bank
(Chossoudovsky, 1994; Danaher, 1994). These players not
only have a global strategic vision, but are among the most
active promoters of globalisation, profiting from the continua-
tion of the process.
GOVERNANCE
Governance and globalisation
(continued from page 1)
work, most often an international con-
vention.
A number of scholars have focused
their studies on the effectiveness of
international regimes, where effective-
ness can be defined as the degree to
which international environmental
accords and organisations lead to
changes in behaviour that help solve
collective problems. However, the
assessment of the effectiveness of an
international accord or regime is gener-
ally rather difficult to establish, in the
same way as is the effectiveness and
corresponding evaluation of public poli-
cies at the national level. The nature
and extent of international environmen-
tal commitments have been trans-
formed in recent years as states have
taken on more responsibilities under
treaties and agreements which are
increasingly stringent and with which




Common property resources can be
broadly defined as those in which a
group of people have co-equal rights,
specifically rights which exclude the
use of these resources by other people
(World Bank, 1992). Common Property
Resources Management Theory
(CPRMT) looks at the ways in which
individuals and groups organise them-
selves to govern and manage common
property resources. Furthermore, it
seeks to contribute to the elaboration of
a theory of self-organisation and self-
governance in a specific area, general-
ly related to specific resources (e.g.,
forests, water, fisheries, etc.) (Ostrom,
1990: 27).
becomes a model able to provide non-demo-
cratic or stateless countries with appropriate
democratic institutions. But it does not address
the interdependency and complexity of gover-
nance situations
Regime theory
Because of an increase in the number of inter-
national institutions, the growing interdependen-
cy and complexity of local and global issues,
and the emergence of new players on the inter-
national scene, it became necessary during the
1990s to redefine international public action. It is
in this context that the concept of governance
has been re-introduced mainly to describe inter-
dependencies and complexities involved in the
operation of a given community or institution,
generally limited to a geographical area and
even to a specific issue (such as, for example,
polar bears) or resources (e.g., water). The idea
is not to focus on the operation of structures, but
rather to understand the forces and powers
involved in the overall process governing the
issue in question. In the context of international
relations theory, the concept of area-specific
governance has been used at two levels,
regime theory above state level and Common
Property Resources Management Theory below
the state level.
Regime thinking has initiated a new trend in
consideration of international institutions. The
classic definition of an international regime is a
set of “principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expec-
tations converge in a given issue area”.
Consequently, regimes are centred on nation-
states, even though they can and often do
involve other players when it comes to their for-
mulation, implementation, and evaluation. In
other words, Regime Theory pertains to a spe-
cific issue generally located at the supra-nation-
al level, often involving the solution of a specific
collective problem by means of the co-operation
of nation states and other players. Such a
regime is generally grounded in a legal frame-
In the literature of political science, the idea of governance
involves a broad range of concepts. Nevertheless, four dif-
ferent schools of thought can be identified, namely structural
or good governance, regime theory, common property




Structural governance is a tendency that involves mainly the
democratic structures of a state at a national level only. In
this context, the term of governance has been mainly used
by the World Bank since the early 1990s. World Bank work-
ing papers usually refer to the more eloquent concept of
‘good governance’, introduced to address politically sensitive
questions regarding state reform in developing countries,
which were promoted in the main by international financial
institutions. While the statutes of organisations, such as the
World Bank and the IMF, expressly forbid them to take up
political issues, the use of the concept of governance has
allowed these institutions to interfere in political and social
issues without directly confronting the governments con-
cerned. The World Bank has used the concept of good gov-
ernance in a didactic manner, mainly in Africa to determine
the institutions and political practices that would be neces-
sary for the (industrial) development of a given country
(Senarclens, 1998 : 92), in other words in order to obtain
structural adjustment loans. 
The concept of good governance has also been used in the
same way within the UNCED process with the aim of creat-
ing a political climate suitable for so-called sustainable
development. In this context, governance came to be
defined as three things: the participation of states in interna-
tional law-making; the evolution of the decision-making
mechanisms of international institutions; and the participa-
tion of non-governmental entities in national and internation-
al decision-making and implementation processes. In both
the World Bank and the UNCED context the notion of (good)
governance appears to be very close to that of government,
albeit with additional participation by selected non-govern-
mental organisations (both business and not-for-profit).
Moreover, it refers to broadly accepted structures of govern-
ment, whose aim it is to define a certain way of operating
state institutions, usually modelled after Western democra-
cies, or more precisely that of the United States. It then
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CPRMT takes a stakeholder approach, where each stake-
holder is directly affected by what the others do. It also makes
very specific assumptions about the nature of the stakes.
While theoretically and conceptually very solid, it is difficult to
extrapolate CPRMT beyond the local level, beyond the area
of natural resources, and beyond some basic assumptions
about stakeholder interests.
Global governance
Global governance is certainly the most prominent, but also
the vaguest use of the term governance. It is rooted in the
idea that economic and financial globalisation have pro-
foundly redistributed economic and political power, thus chal-
lenging State authority. Since the 90s, the development of
humanitarian interventions has altered the previous basis of
inter-state order, allowing for supra-state players to increas-
ingly interfere in national and local matters. These and other
changes have been conceptualised, albeit not systematically,
by the Commission on Global Governance, meeting on a reg-
ular basis in Geneva since 1992. In a report entitled Our
Global Neighbourhood, the Commission defined the concept
of governance as follows:
“Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals
and institutions, public and private, manage their com-
mon affairs. It is a continuing process through which con-
flicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and
co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal insti -
tutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance,
as well as informal arrangements that people and institu-
tions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their
interest” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995).
Such a definition encapsulates almost everything, from the
notion of individuals working together to that of co-operation
among nation-states. Typical of UN – and particularly
UNCED – jargon, this conceptualisation does not take into
account the power differentials between individuals and insti -
tutions, or their strategic interests. By enlarging the concept
of global governance to include grassroots players and local
peoples, a number of authors have elevated civil society
players to global players, thus not only confusing levels, but
moreover ignoring the status and role of institutions. This,
however, is not to say that local levels and actions are not rel-
evant when it comes to dealing with concrete issues and day-
to-day concerns. Indeed, many international institutions and
GOVERNANCE
organisations now increasingly transfer their
capacity to implement to local players (Tamiotti
& Finger, forthcoming). This may have less to do
with an emerging global civil society than with
yet another instrumentalisation of the local by
the global, furthermore bypassing nation-states
in the process. In no way can such civil society
activities be conceptualised as an organised
counter-force to newly emerging global players.
The four conceptualisations of governance men-
tioned here all have their shortcomings, Good
Governance Theory being particularly non-origi-
nal, as it confuses governance with (American
style) government. Global Governance Theory
is closer to wishful thinking than to actual reality:
civil society and corresponding civil society
NGOs cannot be seen as being on an equal
footing with other newly emerging global actors,
such as TNCs and multilaterals. Moreover glob-
al governance is particularly a-political, and in
this respect a typical outcome of the UNCED
public relations exercise (Chatterjee & Finger,
1994). Common Property Resources
Management Theory is conceptually very
sound, but deals mainly with natural resources
management at a sub-national level. As such, it
does not really address the issue of institutions
and organised players and their interests.
Regime Theory is, in my view, the most interest-
ing and promising approach to governance, as it
identifies the supra-national level and explicitly
addresses the issue of organisations and insti-
tutions. However, Regime Theory refers to sec-
toral issues, and does not really constitute a
comprehensive approach. Furthermore, it
remains very state-centric. Finally, all four gov-
ernance theories focus on one policy level with-
out relating it to all other levels.
Global governance:
money and power
The main players involved in collective problem-
solving at the global level are governments,
international and multilateral institutions, TNCs,
and some NGOs. They deal with such issues as
development, trade (liberalisation and
re-regulation), and security. 
The past fifty years have been charac-
terised by the expansion of internation-
al institutions and public players, carry-
ing out international policies, some of
which are self-attributed. They include
the United Nations system with its var-
ious agencies, the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, i.e., the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, and the
General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs, leading in 1995 to the creation
of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). All three types of institutions
developed in parallel over the past 50
years, sometimes with overlapping
missions and activities. While the
United Nations, with its multiple agen-
cies, has become more and more frag-
mented and thinly spread (which
became particularly problematic when
funds got scarce), the Bretton Woods
institutions, especially the World Bank,
have invaded UN development territory
by subsuming social development and
sustainability into their economic devel-
opment agenda. The GATT, on the
other hand, developed a powerful
dynamic of trade liberalisation, and by
doing so, somewhat undermined the
agendas of both the UN and the
Bretton Woods institutions. 
Today, in the era of economic, ecologi-
cal, cultural, and technological globali-
sation, with their emerging problems,
paralleled by the growing importance of
TNCs and NGOs, these international
public players have largely redefined
themselves and regrouped around
three key issues: security, sustainable
development and trade regulation. 
The UN, under heavy financial pres-
sure, is currently refocusing on issues
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of security, the safeguard of international boundaries, human
rights protection, and humanitarian intervention. In doing so,
the UN is abandoning one of its core mandates, development
– this is being taken over by the Bretton Woods institutions,
especially, the World Bank, which is in a more favourable
financial position and is sensitive to public opinion. Indeed,
the World Bank, UNDP (the UN Development Programme),
and UNEP (the UN Environment Programme), already linked
through the GEF (Global Environmental Facility), seem to be
regrouping around the issue of sustainable development, and
this might well lead up to a new ‘Earth Bank’. Finally, there is
the issue of trade and trade regulation. Having actively pro-
moted trade liberalisation, the GATT and the WTO now
increasingly come under pressure from public opinion, devel-
oping countries, and TNCs, asking for the reintroduction of
some sort of trade regulation. In order to do this, however, the
WTO will have to regroup with organisations such as ISO (the
International Standardisation Organisation), and other private
players. This illustrates that, at the global level, the definition
of future governance mechanisms is driven by financial and
economic interests as well as corresponding power, mainly of
TNCs. As a result, privately defined standards are likely to
become perfectly acceptable tools for global trade regulation.
The environment, as a cross-cutting issue, relates to all three
dimensions – security, sustainable development and trade
regulation. Indeed, environmental degradation has become
an issue of security. Examples are found in the potential con-
flicts arising from scarcity of natural resources (such as
water), or from transnational environmental damage (such as
nuclear disasters). Secondly, since UNCED, environmental
protection has been reframed in terms of ‘sustainable devel-
opment’, and UN bodies, such as the UNDP and the World
Bank, have been keen to promote corresponding (sustain-
able) development projects. The environment also pertains to
trade: while environmental protection was and still is consid-
ered to be an impediment to trade, it is also becoming an
argument, or perhaps an excuse, for re-regulating trade.
National governance:
managing networks
It is of course at the national level where governments still
have the strongest hold on public affairs. Nevertheless, even
there one can observe the erosion of traditional politics, both
in terms of the policy process (policy-formulation, policy
implementation, and compliance) and in terms
of public management where more and more
stakeholders are involved. In parallel, one can
observe how new types of policies – i.e., facili -
tating, enabling, incentive-based, etc. – are
made necessary since traditional ‘command
and control’ policies are no longer effective. As
a result, various stakeholders – e.g. business-
es and NGOs – are being included both in the
definition of the (environmental) policies and
their implementation. 
This is not (yet) comparable to the situation at
the global level, where governments are clearly
only one among many players involved in man-
aging public affairs. In this respect, the term
governance at the national level is not entirely
appropriate. Governments retain their ultimate
power, i.e., sovereignty over their territory, as
well as control over legislation. Nevertheless,
the capacity to get things done is increasingly
dependent upon a government’s ability to
mobilise the various players involved.
None of the above governance theories
addresses this issue at the national level. One
has to look at theories of public management to
find a conceptualisation of this development. If
the public service in question can be delivered
for the most part by the market, there is a clear
trend from public service provision to regulation.
Where this is not the case, i.e., when public ser-
vice is mainly the result of public provision, one
can identify new theoretical conceptualisations
such as “network management”. Here the role of
government is to mobilise and facilitate a com-
plex network of public, private, and not-for-profit
players. Unfortunately, such conceptualisations
are never fed into the larger framework of gov-
ernance, nor related to developments occurring
above and below the nation-state level.
Local governance
At the local level, governance is a totally differ-
ent matter. In the era of globalisation, the local
becomes synonymous with exploitation
and domination, where it is used by the
global to further the process of globali-
sation. The local is where problems
first become visible – even if they are
only symptoms of global problems –
and where they need to be solved as
they arise, but it is also where the
resources and means to address such
problems are scarcest. If these prob-
lems become too overwhelming,
national and global players intervene.
In non-crisis situations, national politics
generally defines the local as the level
at which all global, regional and nation-
al policies will ultimately (have to) be
implemented. It is also the level which
gives legitimacy to the entire public pol-
icy chain. Many collective issues may
be handled more efficiently at the local
level as populations often have inti-
mate knowledge and experience of
local ecosystems, as well as a sense of
continuity with a given place.
This level of governance has only been
recognised in the context of larger
global problems, in particular after the
publication of the Brundtand Report in
1987. The need for and the role of local
actions has been enhanced by Agenda
21, agreed to at UNCED, and which led
to a spate of local initiatives throughout
the world. Such local initiatives, howev-
er, are rarely self-contained local gov-
ernance mechanisms, as they are part
of a larger concept of implementing a
‘global public policy’. 
True local governance is something
else, namely community-based local
problem-solving within the larger
framework of globalisation and locali-
sation as outlined above, and of ‘learn-
ing our way out’ of the dead end of
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industrial civilisation (e.g., Finger & Asún, forthcoming). Such
collective problem-solving efforts will become increasingly
necessary parallel to the process of globalisation and the
destructive effects it has on local communities and their
livelihoods. They are also quite different from the efforts con-
ceptualised by Common Property Resources Management
Theory. Indeed, the weakness of that theory lies in the fact
that it does not contextualise common property resources
management, particularly within the larger framework of glob-
alisation, although this is where the most innovative gover-
nance efforts take place.
Governance efforts as I have defined them above, can be
seen as attempts to solve (public) problems collectively by
identifying the relevant stakeholders – and can be identified
at global, national, and local levels. Even though the stakes,
and often the players involved are different at each of the
three levels of governance, the levels are not independent
from another, but nor are they at all co-ordinated.
This is particularly problematic in the case of the four theories
discussed above, which all focus on their specific levels.
Global Governance Theory maintains the illusion that gover-
nance can be an encompassing concept linking the local, the
national, and the global into one coherent governance frame-
work. As such, Global Governance Theory – along with
Common Property Resources Management Theory – leads
one to believe that all the players involved in a given gover-
nance mechanism are equal partners, deciding about their
common fate and/or the use of their resources. In this
respect, all four governance theories are particularly perni-
cious: they hide power relationships and the players’ strate-
gic interests. This is particularly problematic at the global
level. 
Global players now have a significant advantage over local
and even national players, as they are more mobile and often
richer. As a result, they exploit the local, particularly the local
resources and manpower, by playing them against each
other. Increasingly, the global players, mainly the TNCs, also
exploit nation-states, or nation-states are simply instrumen-
talised in order to better exploit the local. If the national can-
not be instrumentalised by the global players – say for exam-
ple by the multilateral institutions – it is simply bypassed, as
in the case of the World Bank which works directly with north-
ern and southern NGOs when it comes to implementing
some of its objectives.
A comprehensive
approach to governance
It is doubtful whether any of these three levels is
the appropriate one when it comes to dealing
with globalisation and its negative conse-
quences: indeed the global level is too interest-
ed and involved in pursuing the process for it to
be an appropriate level to address it. The
nation-state, in turn, is either already too instru-
mentalised by the global actors or simply not the
appropriate level when it comes to addressing
the main problems caused by globalisation,
such as the cultural and the ecological conse-
quences of globalisation, in particular, but prob-
ably also the economic problems. The local
level, in turn, even though the most innovative
one, is probably too small and too vulnerable to
national and global forces.
One therefore has to think of other levels of gov-
ernance when it comes to addressing the nega-
tive consequences of the globalisation process.
Key requirements for such levels to be relevant
pertain, in my view, to some sort of ecological
integrity or coherence (e.g., bio-regionalism,
eco-regions, watersheds, etc.), but also to some
sort of cultural dimension. The main stake in the
age of globalisation, pertains to ecological and
cultural survival. Despite the wealth of literature
on eco-regions, the cultural aspect still has to be
clarified. Nevertheless, both the ecological and
the cultural dimensions point to a regional
approach to governance, which, depending on
the country and the region, can either be of
supra- or of sub-national nature. There is yet
another advantage to defining governance at
such a regional level, as most of the gover-
nance mechanisms can still be designed, as
opposed to having to be reclaimed. The original
strategy of the ‘new politics’ thus would precise-
ly be in the design of such new regional gover-
nance mechanisms. 
In the design of such regional governance
mechanisms, one could certainly be inspired by
Regime Theory, as well as by Common
this conceptualisation would have to
occur within the larger context of the
globalisation-localisation dynamics,
taking into account the respective pow-
ers and strategic interests of the vari-
ous global and national playerrs.
Finally, such a conceptualisation would
have to locate itself within the overall
framework of collective problem-solv-
ing or ‘learning our way out’ (Finger &
Asún, forthcoming), the main issue
being the level at which such collective
problem-solving makes most sense
and has most autonomy.
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